IE543 INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS
| Course Code: | 5680543 |
| METU Credit (Theoretical-Laboratory hours/week): | 3 (3.00 - 0.00) |
| ECTS Credit: | 8.0 |
| Department: | Industrial Engineering |
| Language of Instruction: | English |
| Level of Study: | Graduate |
| Course Coordinator: | Prof.Dr. YUSUF ÇAĞLAR GÜVEN |
| Offered Semester: | Fall or Spring Semesters. |
Course Objectives
Most industrial engineers are involved in managment decisions having organisation-wide effects. Such decisions require an integrated, industry-wide perspective that must be supported by a knowledge of underlying economic structures. Issues concerning competition, marketing, finance, technology management etc. are better understood when we understand how markets do and do not work. This course helps to acquire an economy-theoretic basis to understand such issues.
At the end, the successful student will have developed a capacity for basic quantitave analysis that will provide economic insight to management problems.
Content comprises a survey of neoclassical microeconomic theory at an intermediate level, concentrating on market structures, pricing decisions, regulation and agency. Coverage has ben updated this semester, placing less emphasis on consumption and production in favour of new topics such as property rights, market failures and contracts.
Course Content
A review of quantitative microeconomics theory covering demand, production and market structures. A selection of medium -to -long term issues such as competition and pricing. Concepts of equilibrium and welfare. Modern topics in industrial economics such as the transaction cost and property rights approaches and government regulation.
Course Learning Outcomes
Students are to acquire knowledge and sound understanding of:
- the demand and supply model of partial equilibrium analysis
- overview of consumption and production
- market structures in a market economy
- production decisions and competitive strategies under different market conditions
- pricing theory
- property rights, externalities and public goods
- asymmetric information
- contract theory